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Labor and Employment
by Patrick L. Coyle*
and Alexandra V. Garrison"
Courts within the Eleventh Circuit handed down a number of
important opinions affecting labor and employment during the January
1, 2010 to December 31, 2010 survey period.' The following is a
discussion of those opinions.
I.

FAMILY MEDICAL LEAvE ACT

In Krutzig v. Pulte Home Corp.,2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit addressed an issue of first impression and
aligned itself with several other circuits, concluding that the right to
commence leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA) is not absolute.4 In Krutzig the court of appeals addressed a
plaintiff's claim that her employer interfered with her right to take
In
FMLA leave when her employer terminated her employment.
affirming the holding of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, the Eleventh Circuit held that "an employee who
requests FMLA leave has no greater protection against her employment

* Senior Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Notre Dame (BA., magna cum laude, 1999); University of Virginia School of Law (J.D.,
2004). Member, State Bars of Georgia and South Carolina.
** Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Dartmouth College
(A.B., magna cum laude, 2007); University of Virginia School of Law (J.D., 2010). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Eleventh Circuit labor and employment law during the prior
survey period, see W. Christopher Arbery & Valerie N. Njiiri, Laborand Employment, 2009
Eleventh Circuit Survey, 61 MERCER L. REV. 1177 (2010).
2. 602 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2010).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
4. Krutzig, 602 F.3d at 1236.
5. Id. at 1233.
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being terminated for reasons unrelated to an FMLA request than she did
before submitting the request."
In the underlying proceedings, the district court granted summary
judgment on the plaintiff's FMLA interference claim in favor of the
defendant employer on three alternate grounds.' First, the district
court found that the plaintiff "failed to provide any medical evidence
substantiating her alleged medical condition and entitlement to FMLA
leave." Second, the district court concluded that the plaintiff failed to
prove that she submitted a valid FMLA leave request. Finally, the
district court held that the plaintiff would have been terminated despite
her request for FMLA leave. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the
first two grounds for granting summary judgment were not raised by the
defendant in its motion and, therefore, those grounds should not have
been a basis for summary judgment.9 Regardless, the Eleventh Circuit
only addressed the third ground for summary judgment: the plaintiff's
employment would have been terminated regardless of the plaintiff's
request for FMLA leave.' 0
The plaintiff, Betsy Krutzig, began working for the defendant, Pulte
Home Corporation (Pulte), as a sales associate selling homes in Sarasota,
Florida, in January 2005. In June 2007, Krutzig injured her foot at
work, but she did not initially request leave for the injury. The following
month, Krutzig was placed on a thirty-day performance plan after
receiving two written warnings from Janet Parsons, her immediate
supervisor. On Friday, August 17, 2007, Krutzig contacted Pulte's
human resources representative, Jessica Hernandez-Parkman, who
worked at the Estero, Florida facility, and requested FMLA leave to
coincide with her scheduled surgery on her injured foot. HernandezParkman faxed forms pertinent to medical leave to Krutzig and provided
contact information so Krutzig could file a claim for short-term
disability-benefits with an insurance company. Krutzig responded by
faxing Hernandez-Parkman a form signed by her doctor. Krutzig also
attempted to have Parsons sign her leave form that same day; however,
Krutzig was never able to ask for approval."
On Friday, August 17, 2007, Krutzig met with an angry customer who
had complained to the CEO of Pulte about a situation involving a home
the customer was purchasing. After the meeting, the customer spoke

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1234.
Id.
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1235-36.
Id. at 1233.
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with Jill Hoffman, Pulte's Vice President of Sales. Hoffman contacted
Jeff Cooper, Pulte's Director of Sales in Sarasota, to discuss the problem.
The following day, Cooper called Hoffman and notified her of his decision
to terminate Krutzig.12 When Krutzig returned to work on Monday,
Cooper informed Krutzig "that her employment had been terminated."1 3
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Pulte on Krutzig's claims for FMLA retaliation
and Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)u interference; however, the most significant part of the decision in Krutzig stems
from the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion regarding the plaintiffs FMLA
interference claim." To establish a claim for interference, "an employee need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he
was entitled to the benefit denied."1 6 The employee does not need to
"allege that [her] employer intended to deny the benefit, because 'the
employer's motives are irrelevant.'"" The Eleventh Circuit "previously
concluded that, if an employer [could] show that it refused to reinstate
an employee for a reason unrelated to FMLA leave, the employer [would]
not [be] liable for failing to reinstate the employee after the employee
[had] taken FMLA leave."18 However, "[olther circuits have extended
the same analysis to FMLA claims based on interference with the right
to commence FMLA leave."" These circuits explained that the "right
to non-interference with the commencement of leave is not absolute, and
if a dismissal would have occurred regardless of the request for FMLA
leave, an employee may be dismissed, preventing her from exercising her
right to leave or reinstatement."20
Prior to Krutzig, the Eleventh Circuit had not decided whether the
right to FMLA leave commencement was absolute.2 1 When presented
with this issue, the court decided to follow the reasoning of its sister
circuits who have determined "that the right to commence FMLA leave

12. Id. at 1233-34.
13. Id. at 1234.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
15. See Krutzig, 602 F.3d at 1233, 1236.
16. Id. at 1235 (quoting Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199, 1207
(11th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199, 1208 (11th Cir.
2001)).
18. Id. at 1236.
19. Id.; see, e.g., Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2008); Bones v. Honeywell
Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 2004); Arban v. West Publ'g Corp., 345 F.3d 390 (6th Cir.
2003).
20. Krutzig, 602 F.3d at 1236; see, e.g., Phillips, 547 F.3d at 911-12; Bones, 366 F.3d
at 877-78; Arban, 345 F.3d at 401.
21. Krutzig, 602 F.3d at 1236.
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is not absolute, and that an employee can be dismissed, preventing her
from exercising her right to commence FMLA leave, without thereby
violating the FMLA, if the employee would have been dismissed
regardless of any request for FMLA leave."" The court related this
analysis to Krutzig's situation and explained that the unrebutted
evidence of Cooper's lack of awareness of Krutzig's request to commence
leave when he terminated her employment, established as a matter of
law that Krutzig's termination was for circumstances separate from her
requested leave.23 At his deposition, Cooper testified that his decision
to terminate Krutzig was based on her failure to correct the problems in
her performance plan, such as her attitude, teamwork, and lack of
communication with customers. Krutzig failed to provide evidence to
support a conclusion that Cooper knew of her FMLA leave request when
he decided to terminate her employment.24
Krutzig clarified a previous conflicting assertion that the Eleventh
Circuit made about the existence of an absolute right to commence
FMLA leave." In O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc.,26 the
Eleventh Circuit set forth the standard for establishing an interference
claim under the FMLA." The court stated that "[u]nlike the right to
commence leave, an employer can deny the right to reinstatement in
certain circumstances, because United States Department of Labor
regulation qualifies the right."28 This suggests that an employee has
an absolute right to commence FMLA leave. The court in Krutzig,
however, noted that its opinion in O'Connorunnecessarily distinguished
between the right of reinstatement and the right to commence leave
under the FMLA.29 The court explained that O'Connor only involved
a reinstatement claim and observed that its comment about the right of
an employee to commence FMLA leave was non-binding dicta.3 o In
addition to clearing up this ambiguity, Krutzig is significant because it
brings the Eleventh Circuit in line with the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, which previously

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1234.
See id. at 1236.
200 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2000).
See id.
Id. at 1354 (citation omitted).
Krutzig, 602 F.3d at 1236 n.1.
Id.
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reached the same conclusion that no absolute right to commencing
FMLA leave exists."'
II.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Service, Inc." is a highly technical
case that clarifies which employers are subject to the minimum wage
and overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA)." In Polycarpe, the question before the Eleventh Circuit was
whether the defendant employers had sufficiently engaged in interstate
commerce to fall within the scope of enterprise coverage under the
FLSA. 34 The court held that in the enterprise liability context, the
proper analysis for determining whether an employer must comply with
the FLSA is whether its employees handle, sell, or work on "goods" or
"materials" that were previously produced in or moved interstate,
In
regardless of whether the goods were purchased intrastate."
applying this analysis, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that the scope of
the FLSA is broader than the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida had held."
The plaintiffs in Polycarpe were landscapers, security-system
technicians, and construction workers who alleged that their employers-the defendants-failed to pay them a federally mandated minimum
wage, overtime, or both under the FLSA. The defendants provided
services to customers locally within the state of Florida, but some of the
defendants also offered products along with their services. The district
court dismissed the cases, concluding that the FLSA did not cover the
defendants' businesses.3 ' The district court reasoned that "because the
employers had purchased potentially qualifying 'goods' or 'materials'
intrastate after those items had 'come to rest,' no sufficient interstatecommerce connection existed to [trigger] FLSA coverage."3 8 In several
of the cases, the district court also concluded that the plaintiffs did not
handle the type of "goods" or "materials" that would subject the employer
to FLSA coverage." One of the cases, Flores v. Nuvoc, Inc.,4 was

31. Id. at 1236; see Phillips,547 F.3d at 911-12; Bones, 366 F.3d at 877-78;Arban,345
F.3d at 401.
32. 616 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2010).
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
34. Polycarpe, 616 F.3d at 1219-20.
35. Id. at 1228.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 1219-20.
38. Id. at 1220 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id.
40. 610 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
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dismissed because the defendant allegedly failed to meet the minimum
On appeal the
annual sales requirement to receive FLSA coverage.
plaintiffs' cases were consolidated."'
The FLSA requires compliance from both individuals and enterprises
In Polycarpe, the Eleventh Circuit
engaged in interstate commerce.
what kinds of employers are
for
analyzing
first laid out the framework
of the FLSA." Employers
section
coverage
enterprise
subject to the
pay
their employees minimum
who meet the FLSA's preconditions must
wage and overtime pay if the employees work more than forty hours per
week.45 The court focused its analysis on enterprise coverage, explaining that
[aln employer falls under the enterprise coverage section of the FLSA
if it (1) "has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, or ...

has employees handling, selling, or

otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or
produced for commerce by any person" and (2) has at least $500,000 of
"annual gross volume of sales made or business done." 46
Next, the Eleventh Circuit explained the "coming to rest" doctrine and
'The 'coming to rest'
its relation to FLSA enterprise coverage."
doctrine [states] that interstate goods or materials can lose their
interstate quality if the items have already come to rest within a state
The Eleventh Circuit
before intrastate purchase by a business."'
clarified that the "coming to rest" doctrine is inapplicable in the
enterprise liability context. 49 Accordingly, the court explained that if
a district court applies the "coming to rest" doctrine by focusing on
where a defendant buys an item instead of where the item was produced
and enters judgment for a defendant on the basis that the goods or
materials had "come to rest" before being purchased intrastate, the
judgment cannot stand.so
The court proceeded by acknowledging and resolving the disagreement
about the interplay of the terms "goods" and "materials" under the
FLSA's handling clause by clarifying the definition of the term "materi-

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Polycarpe, 616 F.3d at 1220.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a).
Polycarpe, 616 F.3d at 1220.
See id. at 1221.
Id.
Id.
Id.

20111

LABOR & EMPLOYMENT

1205

als."s The court defined "materials" in the FLSA as "tools or other
articles necessary for doing or making something."5 2
Next, the above analysis was applied to five of the six cases consolidated in the appeal." In the installation or repair and landscaping
company cases, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court
erroneously applied the "coming to rest" doctrine in granting the
defendants' motions for summary judgment.s' The Eleventh Circuit
emphasized that "[tihe inquiry for enterprise coverage under the FLSA
is whether the 'goods' or 'materials' were in the past produced in or
moved interstate, not whether they were most recently purchased
intrastate."5 Furthermore, the district court failed to address whether
the items presented by the plaintiffs to support enterprise coverage
under the handling clause were "goods" not subject to the ultimate
consumer exception or "materials."5 6 In the final case, Flores, the court
affirmed the district court's judgment as a matter of law, finding that
the plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the minimum $500,000 of annual
gross sales required for the FLSA to cover an enterprise.57
Before the decision in Polycarpe, "the applicability of the 'coming to
rest' doctrine in the FLSA enterprise coverage context was an unsettled
question in this Circuit."" The decision in Polycarpeclarified this area
of the law by concluding that the "coming to rest" doctrine is inapplicable in the enterprise liability context." The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the handling of goods or materials that were purchased in
intrastate commerce (as opposed to interstate commerce) does not

51. Id. at 1221, 1223; see 29 U.S.C. 203(sXl)(AXi) (emphasis added) (stating that the
handling clause imposes enterprise liability on an employer that "has employees engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or . . . has employees handling,
selling, or otherwise working on goods or materialsthat have been moved in or producedfor
commerce by any person").
52. Polycarpe, 616 F.3d at 1224.
53. Id. at 1227-29.
54. Id. at 1227-28.
55. Id. at 1228.
56. Id. at 1227-29. The ultimate consumer exception is found in the definition of
'goods" in the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. 203(i). "Goods" are defined as "goods (including ships
and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects
of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof, but does not include goods
after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof
other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof." Id.
57. Polycarpe, 616 F.3d at 1229.
58. Lira v. Matthew's Marine Air Conditioner, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1319 (S.D.
Fla. 2010).
59. Polycarpe, 616 F.3d at 1221.
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necessarily exclude a business from FLSA coverage but rather the origin
of the alleged goods and materials controls coverage.60
The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion is consistent with holdings in other
circuits. For example, in 1981 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit concluded that "even a business engaged in purely
intrastate activities can no longer claim exemption from FLSA coverage
if the goods its employees handle have moved in interstate commerce. "6 In Dole v. Bishop," the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi reached the same conclusion." In that case, the
district court explained that the "coming to rest" doctrine was viable
under previous versions of the FLSA but can no longer be used in the
context of enterprise coverage." The Eleventh Circuit's rejection of the
"coming to rest" doctrine in Polycarpe not only settles a disputed issue
in Eleventh Circuit employment law, but the decision also clarifies that
the group of employers liable under the FLSA's enterprise coverage
doctrine is broader than previously understood in the Eleventh Circuit.
III.

LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

In Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355,65 the Eleventh Circuit determined that a nonunionized employee had standing to prosecute a claim
under section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)16
where the employee alleged that an agreement between his employer
and a local union violated that statute.67 The Eleventh Circuit decision
is particularly significant because it potentially undermines the ability
of an employer and a union to contract without risking a legal challenge
from an individual employee.
Plaintiff Martin Mulhall's grievance stemmed from a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) entered into between defendants Mardi Gras
Gambling (Mardi Gras) and UNITE HERE Local 355 (Unite). In the
MOA, Mardi Gras and Unite agreed that Unite, the local union, would
provide financial support to a ballot initiative concerning casino gaming,
from which Mardi Gras, Mulhall's employer, would benefit.6 8 Furthermore, if identified as the sole bargaining agent for employees of Mardi

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1228.
Donovan v. Scoles, 652 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1981).
740 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
Id. at 1225.
Id. at 1225-26.
618 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2010).
29 U.S.C. § 186 (2006).
Mulhall, 618 F.3d at 1283-84.
Id.
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Gras, Unite agreed "to refrain from picketing, boycotting, striking, or
undertaking 'other economic activity' against Mardi Gras.""
As
consideration for the agreement, Mardi Gras agreed to help Unite
organize its nonunionized workforce. Mardi Gras promised to provide
a complete list of its employees, including their home addresses, job
classifications, and departments.7 0 Moreover, the assistance included
the use of Mardi Gras' property, including non-public areas, for
organizing; a "neutrality agreement" prohibiting any speech or actions
by Mardi Gras or its agents that state or imply opposition to the union;
a waiver of Mardi Gras' right to seek NLRB-supervised secret elections
to verify the union's majority status, and an agreement to abide by a
less formal "card-check" procedure instead; and a promise not to file
unfair labor practice charges against Unite for violations of employee
rights during the union's organizing campaign.
Pursuant to its obligations under the MOA, Unite spent over $100,000
in a campaign for the ballot initiative supported by Mardi Gras.
Describing its intent to organize Mardi Gras' employees, Unite sent
written notices that demanded Mardi Gras provide the union organization assistance the MOA promised. Mardi Gras refused to provide the
assistance, claiming that the MOA was unenforceable and illegal.7 2
Unite responded to Mardi Gras by filing a petition compelling
arbitration in the Southern District of Florida in accordance with the
MOA's arbitration clause." Unite requested that the MOA be enforced
and emphasized that
if the MOA were found unlawful, it would "request restitutionary
damages ... based on quantum meruit for the time and money the
Union and its members spent on the political campaign to obtain a
gaming license for Mardi Gras (estimated at over $100,000) and over
$100,000 in business which Mardi Gras would have lost from a
boycott."14
Mardi Gras responded by counterclaiming "for a declaration that the
MOA was invalid."" The district court ordered the parties to arbitrate.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 1284.
Id.
Id. at 1284-85 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1285.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Consequently, an arbitrator ruled in favor of Unite, enforcing the MOA
and requiring Mardi Gras to provide the promised union assistance."
Throughout the dispute between Mardi Gras and Unite, Mulhall
sought to prevent enforcement of what he believed to be "an illegal and
collusive arrangement between a union and an employer."" Mulhall
filed the present action seeking an injunction on the grounds that
§ 302(a)-(b) of the LMRA was violated by the MOA." Section 302 of
the LMRA prohibits employers from paying, lending, and delivering any
money or thing of value to any labor organization that attempts to
represent any of the employer's employees that are employed in an
industry that affects commerce." Mulhall's complaint was dismissed
by the district court for lack of standing. The district court held that
Mulhall failed to prove an actual or imminent injury-in-fact because
even if Unite received the organizing assistance from Mardi Gras, it was
possible that Mulhall would never be unionized.'
Mulhall appealed, "claiming [he had] both Article III and prudential
standing to seek to enjoin the MOA pursuant to § 302."81 On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit explained that Mulhall had the burden of demonstrating standing to sue by proving the following: "(1) he has suffered,
or imminently will suffer, an injury-in-fact; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the defendants' conduct; and (3) a favorable judgment is
likely to redress the injury.n,82
In analyzing the standing issue, the Eleventh Circuit explained that
employees like Mulhall have a legally cognizable associational interest;
"Ijiust as [tihe First Amendment clearly guarantees the right to join a
union,"a the First Amendment' also "presupposes a freedom not to
associate with a union."' The court concluded that Mulhall sufficiently
alleged that there was an imminent risk of invasion with this associational interest." The court further held that Mardi Gras' provision of
extensive and varied union organization assistance under the MOA

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 186(aX2).
80. Mulhall, 618 F.3d at 1285-86.
81. Id. at 1286.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1287 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471,
482 (5th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. U.S. CONST. amend I.
85. Mulhall, 618 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. at 1288.
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substantially increased the likelihood that Mulhall would be organized
against his will." The court further explained that "probabilistic
The
harm" is a cognizable injury for the purposes of standing.8
Eleventh Circuit determined that Mulhall's claim satisfied the causation
element of standing because his alleged injury flowed from Mardi Gras'
grant of union organization assistance under the MOA.8" Lastly, the
court concluded that "Mulhall's allegations satisflied] the redressability
requirement [that] . . . 'a favorable decision would amount to a signifi-

cant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that
The Eleventh Circuit
directly redresses the injury suffered."'
explained that the considerable increase in the possibility of unionization
due to the MOA would be removed if Mulhall obtained an injunction for
the enforcement of the MOA."
In response to Unite's suggestion that the prudential standing doctrine
barred Mulhall's claim, the Eleventh Circuit found that Mulhall's "claim
The prudential standing
raise[d] no prudential standing concerns."
doctrine consists of "three non-constitutional, non-jurisdictional, policybased limitations on the availability of judicial review."" The court
concluded that Mulhall satisfied the requirements "that the complaint
not require the court to pass on abstract questions or generalized
grievances better addressed by the legislative branches[] and . . . that
the plaintiff assert his or her own legal rights and interests rather than
the legal rights and interests of third parties."" After a more significant analysis, the Eleventh Circuit determined that Mulhall satisfied
"the 'zone-of-interests' test, which limits judicial review to claims of
injury that are sufficiently related to the core concerns of a given
statute ."

In response to Unite's argument that Mulhall's claim was not ripe
because his injury was contingent on the outcome of Mardi Gras'
lawsuit, the Eleventh Circuit determined that there was only a remote
The court
contingency created by Mardi Gras' parallel litigation.

87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1163
(11th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 1290.
90. Id. (quoting Harrell v. Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1260 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1291.
93. Id. at 1290.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1291-92.
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explained that it would be unlikely that Mardi Gras would succeed in its
appeal of the district court's judgment confirming the arbitration award
and upholding the validity of the MOA."
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately held "that Mulhall ha[d] constitutional and prudential standing to maintain his claim for injunctive relief
under § 302 of the Labor Relations Management Act, and that his claim
[was] ripe for review." Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
district court and remanded the case. 99
This case presents an emerging issue in Eleventh Circuit labor law,
and although the court resolved the standing and ripeness issues, it
emphasized that the question of whether LMRA § 302 provides an
Eleventh Circuit claimant with "a private right of action is an issue
'separate and distinct' from the issue of standing."'o The court also
refused to decide the question of whether the organizing assistance
specified in the MOA actually violates LMRA § 302, stating that "[tihe
merits [are] for the district court to decide on remand.""o'
Courts in other circuits have also addressed the standing, private right
of action, and injunctive issues that were presented in Mulhall. For
example, in Patterson v. Heartland Industrial Partners, LLP,102 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio decided
a case with facts strikingly similar to those in Mulhall.x' The district
court found that the plaintiffs opposing a neutrality agreement between

97. Id. at 1292.
98. Id. at 1294.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1293 (quoting Wilderness Soc'y v. Kane Cnty., 581 F.3d 1198, 1215 (10th
Cir. 2009).
101. Id. at 1294.
102. 428 F. Supp. 2d 714 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
103. See id. at 716-17. The employer and union formed an agreement providing the
union with company cooperation to organize membership drives in exchange for specific
terms of how union representation would look at the company if the drive proved
successful. Id. In exchange for organizing the campaign, "the company agreed to provide
full names and addresses; access to the workplace to permit the union [to] conduct its
campaign; and the company would refrain from speaking unfavorably about the union."
Id. at 717. In exchange the employer gained
the union's agreement to limit its organizing campaign to a ninety day period; to
agree not to speak unfavorably about the employer during the campaign; and in
the event that the organizing was unsuccessful, the union agreed to only conduct
one organizing campaign per year and no more than [three] organizing campaigns
in a five year period.
Id. Also, a "card-check process" would be established to determine the campaign's success
instead of holding an election to determine the union's representation. Id. According to
the agreement, most of the agreement's terms were to be submitted to arbitration in the
event of a dispute. Id.
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their employer and a union had "both constitutional and prudential
standing" and that they could maintain a private cause of action under
the LMRA." The district court also concluded that the employer had
not violated LMRA § 302 because the neutrality agreement was not a
"thing of value" under the LMRA.os
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed this substantive
issue, the holding in Mulhall demonstrates that the confidence with
which unions and employers contract in neutrality agreements may be
weakened because employees have standing to challenge the agreements. 106 It remains to be seen if, when presented with a substantive
challenge, the Eleventh Circuit will join its sister circuits and determine
that agreements between an employer and a union like the agreements
in Mulhall and Patterson, do not constitute an impermissible "thing of
value" under the LMRA.o' Finally, the Eleventh Circuit's holding in
Mulhall weakens an employer's and union's ability to control the forum
for a dispute relating to a neutrality agreement. 0 ' Although the
agreement between the employer and union in Mulhall featured an
arbitration clause, because the employee was not a party to that
agreement and had standing to challenge the legality of it, the employee
could and did attack the agreement through litigation.109
IV.

COMPUTER FRAUD ABUSE ACT

In United States v. Rodriguez,1 o the Eleventh Circuit held that an
employee may violate the Computer Fraud Abuse Act (CFAA) 1 ' by
violating his employer's policy prohibiting employees from obtaining
information from its databases for nonbusiness reasons. 112 The CFAA
prohibits "intentionally access [ing] a computer without authorization or

104. Id. at 719-21, 724-25.
105. Id. at 724-25.
106. See Mulhall, 618 F.3d at 1294.
107. On January 24, 2011, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida entered an order granting the defendant Unite Here 355's motion to dismiss,
finding that "[blecause the assistance promised in the MOA does not constitute a thing of
value, Unite Here's Motion to Dismiss is granted." Order Granting motion to Dismiss at
1, Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, No. 08-61766-CIV-SEITZIO'SULLIVAN (S.D. Fla. Jan.
24, 2011). On February 2, 2011, the plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Plaintiffs
Notice of Appeal, Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, No. 08-CV-61766-Seitz/O'Sullivan (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 2, 2011).
108. See Mulhall, 618 F.3d at 1292-93 (reversing the district court's decision of
mandatory arbitration for employees due to an arbitration agreement).
109. See id. at 1279.
110. 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
112. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260.
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exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby obtain[ing] ... information
from any department or agency of the United States."n' An employee
who violates this section of the CFAA can receive a fine, maximum
sentence of one year imprisonment, or both.n4 The decision in Rodriguez is particularly significant because it bolsters an employer's ability
to protect its electronic databases and computer systems from unscrupulous employees and demonstrates that criminal punishment for those
employees who violate the CFAA is a legitimate risk.
In Rodriguez, the defendant, Roberto Rodriguez (Rodriguez), was
employed by the Social Security Administration (Administration) as a
TeleService representative. Rodriguez's job duties included taking and
answering questions about social security benefits from the public. To
complete these duties, Rodriguez was able to access the Administration's
databases containing sensitive information. This information included
social security numbers, personal addresses, birth dates, individuals'
parents' names, the amounts and types of social security benefits
received by beneficiaries, and a person's personal annual income."'
The Administration maintains a policy prohibiting employees from
obtaining information from its databases absent a legitimate business
reason. The Administration conducted mandatory training sessions,
posted notices in its office, and programmed a banner to appear daily on
every computer screen to inform its TeleService employees about this
policy. The Administration also warned employees that criminal
penalties could be enforced if the policy was violated. Furthermore, the
Administration notified its employees of the policy in writing and
required TeleService employees to acknowledge receipt of the forms in
writing."' Between 2006 and 2008, Rodriguez refused to acknowledge
receipt of the forms, retorting, "Why give the government rope to hang
me?""' Although Rodriguez refused to sign the acknowledgment
forms, the Administration nonetheless allowed Rodriguez to continue in
his role as a TeleService representative. In August 2008, the Administration flagged Rodriguez's employee identification number because of
suspicious activity, and the Administration's records indicated that
Rodriguez had obtained the records of seventeen individuals without an
apparent legitimate business reason. Even after the Administration told

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2XB).
Id. § 1030(cX2XA).
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Rodriguez it was investigating his database use, he continued the
unauthorized activity. 18
In April 2009, Rodriguez was indicted on seventeen counts of violating
the CFAA."' After a trial in July 2009, the jury rejected Rodriguez's
testimony "that he had accessed the personal information as part of a
whistle-blowing operation to test whether his unauthorized use of the
databases would trigger the [Administration's] attention.""'o The jury
found Rodriguez guilty on every count. During sentencing, the
government argued that the statutory maximum sentence of twelve
months provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(cX2XA) did not sufficiently
account for the harm suffered by the victims."2 ' The Southern District
of Florida agreed and "sentenced Rodriguez to [twelve] months of
imprisonment and [twelve] months of supervised release."122
On appeal Rodriguez argued "that he did not exceed his authorized
access to his former employer's databases and that he did not use the
information to further another crime or to gain financially."2 Rodriguez contended that his actions did not violate the CFAA because he
only accessed authorized databases.124 The CFAA, however, makes it
a crime to "intentionally access[] a computer without authorization or
exceed[] authorized access, and thereby obtain. . . information from any
department or agency of the United States"" and defines "exceeds
authorized access" as "to access a computer with authorization and to
use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the
accesser is not entitled to obtain or alter."2 6 At trial, Rodriguez
admitted "that his access of the victims' personal information was not in
furtherance of his duties as a TeleService representative and that 'he did
access things that were unauthorized.'" 27 Thus, his actions violated
both the Administration's policy about accessing databases for nonbusiness purposes and the CFAA. 2 8
Rodriguez relied on the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the CFAA in
LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekkal2 9 in arguing that he had not violated

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 1262.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1263-64.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2XB).
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263.
Id.
581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
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The
the CFAA by accessing databases without authorization.'s
Eleventh Circuit, however, held that his reliance on Brekka was
misplaced.' 3 In Brekka, the Ninth Circuit held that Brekka, an
employee at a residential addiction treatment center, had not violated
the CFAA when he e-mailed documents that he was authorized to obtain
The Eleventh Circuit in Rodriguez
to his personal e-mail account.'
distinguished this case on the basis that the Administration had
informed Rodriguez via its policy that he was not authorized to use the
computer system for nonbusiness reasons, but in Brekka no such policy
existed. 3s
Rodriguez also relied on United States v. John'34 to argue that his
conduct did not violate the CFAA because he did not access the
unauthorized databases in furtherance of a crime.' 5 The Eleventh
Circuit held that his reliance on that case was also misplaced.'36 In
John a Citigroup employee, who was authorized to use her employer's
computers and to view and print account information, used that
information to incur fraudulent charges on Citigroup customers.'3 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
conviction under the CFAA, noting that although the employee was
authorized to access all of the information, "'authorization' as used in
the Act, 'may encompass limits placed on the use of information obtained
by permitted access to a computer system and data available on that
system' if the use is in furtherance of a crime.",13 Rodriguez argued
that unlike the employee in John, he had not used unauthorized
information to commit a crime; thus, he had not violated the CFAA.'s
The Eleventh Circuit, however, reasoned that under the CFAA,
Rodriguez's "use of [the] information [was] irrelevant if he obtained the
information without authorization or as a result of exceeding authorized
access."o The court further explained that the plain language of the
CFAA bars Rodriguez's argument that his conviction could not stand

130. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263.
131. Id.
132. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1130-32, 1137.
133. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263 (citing Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129).
134. 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
135. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263.
136. Id.
137. 597 F.3d at 269, 271.
138. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263 (quoting John, 597 F.3d at 271) (internal quotations
omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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because he never used the unauthorized personal information he
accessed to defraud anyone or to gain financially. 14 1
The decision in Rodriguez highlights the need for employers to inform
their employees about the permissible purposes for which employees may
access information stored on computer databases. The case further
identifies the need for employers to incorporate rules about accessing
computer systems in a written policy: the existence of such a policy may
support criminal liability of employees who violate such a policy and
therefore violate the CFAA. Such potential criminal liability could be
used by employers as a stong deterrent to protect sensitive electronic
information on their databases if they implement appropriate policies
and effectively communicate to employees the limitations of their
database access. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit's broad construction
of the CFAA serves as a warning to employees of the potential consequences from unauthorized access to their employers' computer systems.

141.

Id. at 1264.

